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A SHARED SPIRIT OF JUSTICE
THE UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY,
JUSTICE'S BODY AND SOUL: CANON AND
COMMON LAW'S "COMMON GROUND"
JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA*
In beginning our quest and examination of the superlative
virtue and essential value of justice, we turn first to the Greeks,
who supplied the building blocks for ensuing civilizations to
climb upon and ponder. They have given us one particular
treasure which elucidates the concept. In the Nichomachean
Ethics,1 Aristotle rhapsodizes over an idealized version of justice:
"[J ustice is regarded as the highest of all virtues, more admira-
ble than morning star and evening star, and, as the proverb has
it, 'In justice every virtue is summed up.' It is complete virtue
and excellence in the fullest sense ....
According to an observation by Father John Coughlin,3 our
own St. Thomas Aquinas has taught us the relationship of equity
and law to justice. St. Thomas
recognized equity as an aspect of the virtue of justice, by which
the overly stringent application or interpretation of some posi-
tive law might be measured and, if necessary, corrected. To be
* Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals. Appointed by Governor Mario
M. Cuomo on January 5, 1987 and confirmed by the State Senate on January 27,
1987. B.A., St. John's University, 1959; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law,
1961.
This article is adapted from a speech given by the author at the Eastern Re-
gional Conference of Canon Lawyers, held at the Omni Hotel, Albany, New York, on
May 14, 1997.
'ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 114 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
2 Id. (quoting, with slight variation, Theoguis line 147).
S John J. Coughlin, O.F.M., Canonical Equity, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 403 (1996).
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sure, he valued the intention of the legislator, and did not con-
sider equity an abrogation of the law. ... [H]e would invoke eq-
uity for the common good, and not for the sake of an individual
alone.4
An anecdotal exchange between two 20th Century secular
judicial icons sprinkles some realism and wordplay into our ap-
preciation of the great virtue. Judge Learned Hand, who served
on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, is supposed to have
urged his friend, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, to "Do justice",
as he bade him farewell one day on the steps of the United
States Supreme Court; Holmes smartly responded, "Justice? All
we do here is apply the rules of the game!"5
From countless additional sources, I could assemble lessons
about law as a measurement of an ordered state; equity as a fair,
individualized application of principles of law; and justice as the
blend of the two, and the key benchmark of a good society. If we
search for justice, then, as though through a prism, it often
seems to be a kaleidoscope of oscillating dots, shimmering and
shifting from Aristotle's lofty idealism to St. Thomas's ever-ready
balancing act and then on to Holmes' frank realism. Quite a
sweeping spectrum! The rub with idealized justice, however, is
its administration and delivery by fallible human ministers, in-
escapably through human institutions and instrumentalities. It
is, thus, very hard to catch, connect and pin down those elusive,
bouncing dots.
As civil courts contend with increasing volumes of cases and
strain to achieve the desideratum of universal justice, they
would be foolish, even arrogant, to ignore the obvious limitations
of the human condition and human methods which exert a pow-
erful counterforce against and away from the ultimate and ideal-
ized goal. Unlike obscenity (and I doubt the aphorism even ap-
plies there), we cannot simply say we know justice when we see
it.6 The exploration to locate its epistemological purity, core and
reality, then, is undertaken with ceaseless yearning by philoso-
phers, canonists, jurists, lawyers, students and society itself, but
the destination is always out on a misty horizon and beyond full
Id. at 414.
WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER, THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAviS 264
(1973).
6 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(noting the difficulty in defining obscenity, Justice Stewart stated "I know it when I
see it.").
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or perfect human attainment.
So what is the experience I can share with you, from my
Court of Appeals world, about the judicial process that has
emerged as a jewel of the American democratic experiment-a
centerpiece in the struggle to conquer injustice? What are its
methods, its commonly-rooted principles and practices, and the
Holmesian "rules of the game" that are the fragile foundations
on which the delivery of justice is built and launched? Where do
we find the motivation and will to persist in the daunting, some-
times dispiriting, and endless struggle for equal justice, mired in
empirical realism and human weakness? How do secular courts
earn and keep society's respect and admiration for what we do
and how we do it, recognizing that the respect of the people is
the only true coin of Caesar's realm and the Judicial Branch's
only real, residual power?
My illustrative answers to these posed questions are ten-
dered first through a summary description of New York's Court
of Appeals - an adjudicative body of last resort and a court of law
that struggles every day towards the delivery of justice, some-
times paradoxically in view of its limited factual review powers
under the State Constitution , except for the revived death pen-
alty cases, where our review powers are plenary.8 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes (a bountiful source of one-liners), when asked,
"[wihat is it like up there," meaning in the United States Su-
preme Court, answered "[wie are very quiet there, but it is the
quiet of a storm centre."9 Never has that aphorism been as apt
as now in many courts throughout the land, including my own.
On the civil side of the docket, the cases run from A to Z-
Adoption to Zoning-and on the criminal side, the gamut of cases
is from the mildest offense to the severest-Loitering to Homi-
cide-and now, again, Capital Punishment Murder. We deal
with everything in between, too. All types of controversies thus
swirl about with hurricane-like force and with direct impact on
7 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(A) provides in part:
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be limited to the review of
questions of law except where the judgment is of death, or where the appel-
late division, on reversing or modifying a final or interlocutory judgment in
an action or a final or interlocutory order in a special proceeding, finds new
facts and a final judgment or a final order pursuant thereto is entered ....
Id.
See supra note 7.
Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292
(1920).
37 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
countless people and society in general. In recent decades,
courts are looked to and turned to, sometimes as a source of so-
lutions of first resort, to help control and repair the damage that
diverse disputes and people inflict on one another. We must,
first, decide the cases and, equally importantly, declare the
precedential principles of law for future guidance, under rea-
sonably definitive and reliable rulings.
The New York State Court of Appeals currently handles
close to 5,000 cases a year.'0 In 1996, over thirteen hundred civil
motions for leave to appeal were considered by the full Court;"
two votes equal a grant of leave, akin to the United States Su-
preme Court's four votes for its certiorari grants. We also enter-
tained close to 3,000 applications for leave to appeal on the
criminal docket in 1996.2 These are allocated one-seventh indi-
vidually for each of us seven Judges to decide. In this category of
our work, each of us is randomly assigned over 400 distinct
criminal cases to handle personally each year.
The full Court hears argument and decides about 300 ma-
tured appeals each year." This part of the work reflects our
most well-known, visible tip of the iceberg-the opinions. The
percentage breakdown of these full-dress appeals is about two-
thirds civil and one-third criminal. We handle and decide these
appeals en banc, all seven collectively, collegially and sitting only
in Albany at Court of Appeals Hall-our magnificent 1842 edifice
on Eagle Street. We are a non-resident Court, except for me, so
my six colleagues work, when we are not in formal Session, in
separately maintained, local Chambers in the counties of their
residence around the State. Our conferences and oral argu-
ments, however, take place only in our historic building, where
we all assemble for two weeks out of every five, or on approxi-
mately a monthly basis for the plenary sessions of the Court.
Let me also describe, with confident pride, the superbly pro-
fessional decision-making process of the Court of Appeals. Our
modern case management system, not quite 25 years old, is de-
signed for rule settlement, fairness, due process, intellectual
honesty, plenary participation, neutrality, avoidance of specialty
interests and agendas, and efficient case movement towards
l See COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF N.Y., ANN. REP. OF THE CLERK OF
THE COURT 4-5 (1996).
1' See id. at 5.
12 See id.
" See id. at 4.
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prompt decisions. It is the handiwork, principally, of the crea-
tive genius of the late Chief Judge Charles D. Breitel, the last
elected Chief Judge in 1973. The hallmark in each category of
our work is random assignment and collective, institutional re-
sponsibility and obligations. We work very closely as a team and
get along quite well, despite ordinary human and professional
differences in personality and perspective. The personal differ-
ences are substantially subordinated and absorbed into the
common commitment and unifying enterprise of a higher insti-
tutional purpose. Of course, we occasionally dissent publicly and
forthrightly on matters of principled differences, or out of con-
cern for the future development and change in the law.
From the end of August through the beginning of July of the
following calendar year, the Court hears oral argument on about
35 appeals for two weeks each month at 2:00 p.m. each day. No
one knows which Judge will have the primary reporting respon-
sibility on any given case until after the completion of all argu-
ments on a given day. We are what is called a "Hot Bench,"
orally probing each lawyer and each case, and psychologically
motivated to pay close attention to every word in every case since
there is no pre-conferencing among us. We do not know which
way any Judge may be leaning, or what may be bothering any
one or more of us in any case. The first hint comes when we
hear each other's questions and concerns at oral arguments, and
the lawyers' responses. At the end of the afternoon, we then pick
our assignments randomly from among face-down index cards
carrying the names of each case.
That initiates the next step of responsibility. Each Judge
then re-prepares the drawn case assignment for presentation to
the full Court in conference the very next morning. This re-
preparation means each Judge works on his or her assigned case
on the night of oral argument and the next early morning of con-
ference to formulate a recommendation of result and rationale to
be orally presented to the colleagues at the daily 10:00 a.m. for-
mal conference. Each Judge must, in addition, reassess how he
or she will vote in the other appeals to be reported by the other
colleagues. Additionally, we deal with other conference agenda
matters (for example, motions and administrative rule and policy
issues, and opinions from the preceding session's argued ap-
peals). No Judge writes in fields of particular interest or spe-
cialty; rather, we all serve as generalists. Each vote and the
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workload are, thus, reasonably equalized and meaningful.
Our discussion and debate, which is entirely oral except for
personal notations and handwritten outlines, begin with a pres-
entation by the Reporting Judge, followed by statements from
the Junior Judge and the other Judges, continuing in reverse
seniority finally to the Chief Judge. If a majority or, most often,
a unanimous consensus emerges, then the Reporting Judge will
undertake the responsibility to write the opinion for the Court to
reflect and capture the essence of the tentatively agreed upon
decision and rationale. If the Reporting Judge has not garnered
at least three other concurring votes, then he or she may prepare
a dissenting expression, if there is to be one. In the proportion-
ately few instances when there are differences of view warrant-
ing a dissenting expression, the first Judge to the right of the
Reporting Judge holding a differing view will assume that task
and role. It may surprise you-as it does many lawyers and
judges and journalists who seem to relish and emphasize dis-
harmony-to know that not every instance or case where there
may be initial differences of views results in external dissents.
We are constantly on the lookout for consensus, unanimity and
settlement of the rule of law for more reliable guidance to the
Bench and Bar and society. These are powerful incentives and
paramount considerations of institutional concern and effort, en-
couraged and led by the Chief Judge, Judith S. Kaye, as an equal
participant and as the Chairperson and presiding officer of the
conference.
Judge Richard Wesley of Livonia, New York, is the newest
member of the Court of Appeals. As the resident Judge and on
behalf of his new colleagues, and since the Court was not in full,
formal Session in Albany, I welcomed Judge Wesley during his
first official visit to the Court of Appeals Hall in December, 1996,
after Governor Pataki announced his nomination. 4 I showed
Judge Wesley the Conference Room and we talked about the
round deliberation table symbolizing the strength of a circle,
similar to the symbolism of a Rota, with which canon lawyers
would be familiar. I emphasized to him the institutional bond
and functional connectedness that transcends the assertion of
individualized personalities. I added that the circle of chairs
around that secular sacred place-the Conference Room decision
'" The rest of the Judges on the Court of Appeals have 14 year term, tenured
appointments going back to former Governor Mario Cuomo.
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table and the actual place where we cast our votes in peoples'
cases, confidentially, until the decisions are externally and pub-
licly reported-also symbolizes the equality of the seven votes of
the Judges who temporarily occupy those seats, for 14-year
terms or until constitutional mandatory retirement at 70 years
of age."
This initially oral system of skeptical analysis and plenary
exploration, testing of theory and practicality, are exhilarating
and exhausting exercises. It requires a lot of careful listening
and suppleness of judgment and humility of intellect. Listening
is not a passive act or exercise. It is a vigorous, invigorating, in-
teractive hospitality, a welcoming embrace of shared and some-
times competing wisdom from others with diverse experiences
and backgrounds. Further verification and validation of what
has been tentatively agreed upon around our Conference Room
table comes later, by close scrutiny of the circulated proposed
written opinions and at the re-conferencings of every case at the
next Session of Court, a mere four to five weeks after argument
and after those first rounds of oral conferencings. All these ini-
tial and final discussions are, thus, tested in personal eyeball-
ings at the Conference table, poring over writings and signing on
or off, as the case and conscience may dictate. We fastidiously
fuss with one another on language and principles, and even on
punctuation and footnotes.
We also extensively use the technological wonders of imper-
sonal communication-e-mail, computers and faxes-but the
person-to-person human engagement is a critical dynamic and
wonderful discipline and psychological reinforcement in the ac-
tual decisionmaking. These personal protocols serve the refine-
ment of the process, the litigants and the public, and the devel-
opment of New York's jurisprudence and common law leadership
role in the Nation. They contribute to the positive benefits of co-
operative civility and mutual respect, and they also help keep
the Court extremely current in dealing with the caseloads. De-
cisions are rendered in back-to-back sessions for almost all ar-
gued appeals, on average in 41 days-a self-imposed tyranny.
We maintain this pace and pressure purely by internal peer dis-
cipline, our own accountability mechanisms, and by shared
shouldering of all the categories of decisional work.
One of our currently disquieting concerns is the effect on the
15 See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2(a) (providing 14-year terms).
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management and quality of the Court's already heavy and com-
plex docket of the seemingly inevitable arrival of death penalty
direct appeals in the not-too-distant future. 6 Plenary appellate
review responsibilities are reposed exclusively in our Court with
direct appeals from the trial court judgment and sentence of
death. 17 Chapter One of the Laws of 1995 thus guarantees a
change from a business-as-usual attitude. 8 Changes have al-
ready begun involving rulemaking and preliminary litigation
skirmishes. 9
The experience of highest courts of other states in this re-
spect, according to studies, is not encouraging."0 Of necessity,
there will be a considerable displacement of time from adjudicat-
ing regular, but also very important civil and criminal cases, in
order to attend to the time demands and nature of capital sen-
tence appeals. This is a disconcerting prospect and an enormous
challenge. Notably, some sibling jurisdictions have dealt with
the seemingly singular and exceptional American phenomenon of
death penalty adjudication. I am quite confident that the proud
history of this Court, on which I am privileged to serve, will also
be up to the challenge of handling all the new weighty tasks with
" See id. art. VI, § 3(b) (providing that in criminal cases, appeals to the Court of
Appeals may be taken directly from a court of original jurisdiction when the judg-
ment is of death).
17 See id.
lB 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, vol. 1 (providing the procedures for assigning counsel in
capital cases and imposing capital sentences).
"' See Gary Spencer, Judiciary Budget Left Intact by Governor, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
15, 1997, at 1 (discussing "promised legislation to roll back the 'exorbitant fee struc-
ture' the Court of Appeals set last fall for assigned counsel in capital cases"); Daniel
Wise, Capital Case Assistants Refused Pay by Pataki, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 14, 1997, at 1;
Daniel Wise, Pay Rates for Capital Counsel Adopted by Court of Appeals, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 22, 1996, at 1.
20 See William C. Vickrey, Opinion Filings and Appellate Court Productivity, 78
JUDICATURE 47, 49-50 (1994) (noting the negative effect of capital appeals on the
California Supreme Court's annual production of written opinions and on the profile
of the court's opinions); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1147 (N.J. 1992) (Handler,
J., dissenting) ("The complexity of our capital jurisprudence and the she[e]r volume
of the records in capital trials compel appellate courts to expend inordinate energy
on capital cases.") (citing Stephen Maganini, Closing Death Row Would Save State
$90 Million a Year, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1988, at Al) (reporting that the
California Supreme Court "spends more than half its time reviewing death cases");
Andrew H. Malcolm, Capital Punishment Is Popular, but so Are its Alternatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1989, at A4 (reporting that the Florida Supreme Court spends
one-third of its time on capital cases); Ellen Simon, Death Be Not Cheap, CONN. LAW
TRIBUNE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 1 (noting the negative effect of capital litigation in Con-
necticut); see also DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD (1995)
(discussing the effects of Florida's death penalty).
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superb leadership, professional excellence, and with the greatest
sense of the need for high quality of performance. Frankly, we
must, because these obligations spring from a profound public
trust-to decide all the cases that come before us promptly, thor-
oughly, seriously, fairly and justly.
There is, however, another permeating nuance of our proc-
ess. Ever present to secular judges is a stark realization: that
not long after any of their rulings hit the books or computer
screens-and after the gavel symbolizing their tenure is passed
on to successors-experience and the wisdom of hindsight are
likely to improve or clarify the understanding of a problem or
case. Stare decisis notwithstanding, fresh insights may often
support at least an altered focus or different spin, if not alto-
gether a change of direction. Civil courts sometimes bluntly call
this epiphany an overruler; canonists might classify it as confes-
sion or acknowledgment of error, even a plea for forgiveness of
past mistakes, as the Holy Father has been consistently charac-
terizing some major historical events. Whatever our discipline
or calling, however, people with power occasionally also resort to
semantic euphemisms and squeamish face-savers, and some-
times, instead, they wrap themselves in hubris, dig in, and hug
the error that is just aching for correction. But the truth is that
from time to time everyone has to acknowledge very simply and
directly that they have missed a call. Human beings seem, too
often, so afraid to admit frailty though, and decision-makers ra-
tionalize that frankness and humility might somehow weaken
the legitimacy of the law and tarnish respect for the pertinent
process. They are wrong and confession is truly good for the soul
and for truth.
Change and stability must be blended to coexist in the de-
velopment and application of evenhanded justice, seasoned with
what some of us know as "epikeia." The paradoxical swings and
tensions in law and jurisprudence temper the harsh realization
of having to rule in cases without the benefit of perfectly clear
vision and with the candid acknowledgment of our impoverished
and incomplete knowledge. In Reaching Out, 1 and in a different
but relevant context, the late Father Henri Nouwen refers to the
principle of docta ignorantia, learned ignorance. This is the no-
tion of a humble poverty of mind set, needed to season and soften
2" HENRI J.M. NOUWEN, REACHING OUT: THE THREE MOVEMENTS OF THE
SPIRITUAL LIFE 74 (1975).
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intellectual arrogance and haughtiness, regardless of whether
we operate in secular or ecclesiastical tribunals and universes.2
To offset and balance inherently imperfect exercises of pro-
found responsibility, judges and society, too, reach for and rely
on checks-and-balances. They recognize that judicial rulings are
existentially flawed and final only in this human dimension and
only for their own time and only with a calibrated system of
shared power. Justice Robert Jackson of the United States Su-
preme Court, renowned for his extraordinary interlude of special
service as Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials of the Nazi
Regime, taught that the Supreme Court is not final because it is
infallible; rather, its work appears infallible because it is usually
so final.
The New York Court of Appeals knows that principle well.
Since barely 1 of our 5,000 cases gets to the United States Su-
preme Court each year, we are overwhelmingly final, but also no
more infallible than any other human institution. In Justice
Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United States,3 involving the
internment of Americans of Japanese heritage during World War
II, that Nuremberg Prosecutor, as a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, powerfully reminds the world that: "A military
commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it
is an incident. But if [the Supreme Court] [or the Court of Ap-
peals] review and approve, that passing incident becomes the
doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of
its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image."2' His
magnificent dissenting voice found its vindication decades later
by the historical confession of error by the government of the
United States.
Judges, therefore, must seek comfort levels and conscien-
tious repose in institutional strength, trial and error, testing and
course correction-always drawing on breadth of experience, and
diverse talent and personal qualities of all the members of a final
tribunal, offering justice, very humbly and modestly, through
collective wisdom.
Our decision-making process interweaves a spirit of equity
into decisions, so as to moderate and humanize the strict letter
22 See id. at 104-05.
2 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24 Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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of the law. Father Coughlin's article, to which I alluded earlier,25
aptly describes this beneficial influence in the canonical universe
as follows:
The first constituent of canonical equity is the natural law. It
appeals to those universal and transcendent principles of reality
that render a common morality possible. Another vital factor is
evangelical love, compassion and mercy. An authentic use of
canonical equity recognizes the harmony between gospel justice
and love. A third aspect of canonical equity, historical con-
sciousness, implies a keen awareness of the past and profound
respect for tradition, in order that justice may be rendered in
the here and now. At the same time, it recognizes that cultural
shifts often beckon new and imaginative solutions to legal
26problems.
I was encouraged and emboldened in my thesis to you today,
too, by Father Coughlin's added documentation that:
Paul VI described canonical equity as "the fruit of benignity and
charity" which informs canon law. To paraphrase John Paul II,
canon law is intended to create a juridical structure that fosters
the life of the Church, and the individuals in it, by assigning
primacy to evangelical love, grace and charism. The two Roman
Pontiffs seem to suggest that authentic canonical equity pos-
sesses a significance which serves to protect and elucidate the
logica of ecclesiastical law.
27
These observations seem nicely to identify a common ground
(if I may borrow that grand phrase and enterprise, in the happy
memory of the late Joseph Cardinal Bernardin) joining us as
civil and canon law specialists. I cannot overstate or overem-
phasize the wonder in the search and achievement of commonal-
ity, despite realistic and sometimes sharp conflicts and contrasts
inherent in respective disciplines and particular responsibilities.
An illustrative sampling, a mere taste, from representative cases
and contemporaneous dockets in my experience provides us with
illustrations where religious issues are inescapably intertwined
in our secular decisions and process.
One example is our Court's most recent decision in Grumet
v. Cuomo. 28 The repeated legislative effort to authorize a sepa-
21 See Coughlin, supra note 3.
21 Id. at 421.
217 Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
28 90 N.Y.2d 57 (1997). But see 1997 N.Y. Laws ch. 390, v. 6 (authorizing the
creation of certain union free school districts by municipalities); see also Raymond
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rate school district for the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious en-
clave of Satmar Hasidism, which is a strict form of Judaism, has
produced repeated judicial challenges. 9 This is an amazing story
and ongoing First Amendment saga. Our Court unanimously
struck down the latest statute, which allowed municipalities
meeting certain criteria to form their own school districts." It
was held violative of the Establishment Clause."1
The Supreme Court's decision in Agostini v. Felton32 offers
another intriguing conundrum involving the Federal Reargu-
ment Rule33 in the context of stare decisis (and in relation to the
Hernandez, Albany Vote Defies Courts Again to Back a Hasidic School District, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at Al; Somini Sengupta, Pataki Signs New Bill Allowing Hasi-
dic Public School District, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at B5 (discussing legislation
that would create a special public school district for a small community of Hasidic
Jews in Orange County).
29 See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994) (holding that a statute passed to give the village of Kiryas Joel its own
school district was unconstitutional, as Kiryas Joel did not receive its new govern-
mental authorization as one of many eligible communities under a general law, but
rather under a statute specifically tailored for that village); Board of Educ. of Mon-
roe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174 (1988) (holding that Edu-
cation Law § 3602c does not mandate that a Board of Education must provide spe-
cial services to private school handicapped children exclusively in programs and
classes of the public schools, and that state and federal statutes do not mandate
provision of special services to private school handicapped children on the premises
of the schools they normally attend).
3' See Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d at 57 (discussing the court's invalidation of
chapter 748 of the laws of 1989 which carved out a separate school district for the
village).
See id. at 64 (holding that chapter 241 violates the establishment clause by
effectively singling out the village of Kiryas Joel for special treatment and thereby
demonstrating impermissible governmental endorsement of a religious community).
32 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (5-4 decision) (overruling the Court's earlier decision in
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)). In Aguilar, the Court held that the estab-
lishment clause barred the New York City Board of Education from sending public
school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvan-
taged children pursuant to a congressional program mandated by Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The Agostini Court determined that
Aguilar was not consistent with subsequent establishment clause decisions and de-
clared that Aguilar was no longer good law. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003; see also
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village, 512 U.S. 687 (holding that the New York
statute, 1989 N.Y. Laws ch. 948, which created the Kiryas Joel Village School Dis-
trict to serve a village exclusively populated by the Satmar Hasidim religious sect,
violated the establishment clause). In concurring opinions, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor urged reconsideration of Aguilar. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil-
lage, 512 U.S. at 717 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. at 731 (OConnor, J., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia, in dissent, urged that Aguilar be overruled "at the earliest op-
portunity." Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing that the court may grant relief from a final
judgment for one of the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence or surprise; (2)
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Court's opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey3' on Roe v.
Wade.3") From the many opinions, we must re-assess the sub-
stantive question of aid to students attending religious schools,
because Agostini s overruled Aguilar v. Felton.37 Equally impor-
tant, as the differing opinions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court illustrate, are the procedural implications of belated rear-
guments and potential overrulers, as they clash with the doc-
trine of stare decisis.
New York State Employment Relations Board v. Christ the
King Regional High School38 is another interesting case. Christ
the King is a Roman Catholic secondary school in Middle Village,
Queens County. 9 In the 1980-81 academic year, the school em-
ployed a teaching staff comprised of over 90% lay teachers and
some religious faculty, and offered instruction in both secular
and religious subjects to approximately 1,800 pupils.4° Lay fac-
ulty were employed without regard to their religious beliefs."
The lay faculty had been represented by the Lay Faculty Asso-
ciation since 1976.42 Prior to 1976, the Roman Catholic Diocese
operated the school.4" The union went on strike after the last
collective bargaining agreement expired in 1981." Sixty lay
teachers were discharged from the school and have not been re-
evidence discovered beyond the time for granting a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct; (4) void judgment; (5) judgment has
been satisfied or otherwise discharged, or judgment on which it was based has been
reversed, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should apply prospectively;
(6) any other reason justifying relief). In Aguilar, 117 S. Ct. at 2003, the Court
granted the petitioners' relief from a permanent injunction, concluding that it was
inequitable that the injunction should apply prospectively. Id.
505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (relying on the doctrine of stare decisis to uphold
the essence of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy).
35 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (concluding that a woman's right to an abortion is a fun-
damental, albeit qualified, right).
36 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
37 473 U.S. 402 (1984) (barring New York City public school teachers from pro-
viding remedial education to parochial school students within the confines of the
parochial schools).
38 90 N.Y.2d 244 (1997).
39 See id. at 247; Christ the King Reg'l High Sch. v. Culvert, 644 F. Supp. 1490,
1491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting the school's contention that the New York State
Labor Relations Act was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act).
40 See Christ the King Reg'l High Sch., 644 F. Supp. at 1492.
41 See id.
42 See New York State Empl. Rels. Bd., 90 N.Y.2d at 247.
4' See id.
"See id.
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instated. 5 After an informal investigation, the New York State
Employment Relations Board charged the school with violating
the New York State Labor Relations Act by discharging its em-
ployees due to union activities and by refusing to bargain collec-
tively with the union.8 A state administrative law judge found
that the school violated the Act and recommended that the board
issue an order directing the school to bargain collectively and
reinstate the discharged teachers.4 '7 The board adopted the rec-
ommendation, and brought an action for judicial enforcement
under the New York State Labor Relations Act.48 The question
was whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the New York State
Employment Relations Board violated the Religion Clauses of
the Federal and State Constitutions. 9 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the courts below that the application of the New
York State Labor Relations Act to a religious school did not vio-
late the religious freedom and establishment protections. 50
In Avitzur v. Avitzur,5' a husband was granted a civil divorce
from his wife.52 Under Jewish law, she was not free to remarry
until a Jewish divorce decree, a "Get," was granted by the Beth
Din, the rabbinical tribunal." When her former husband refused
to appear before the Beth Din, she sued in New York courts,
seeking a declaration that her husband had breached the Ketu-
bah, the Jewish marital contract.' She also sought to compel the
husband to appear before the Beth Din.55 The husband sought to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, arguing that resolution of the dispute
would require the civil court to engage in "impermissible consid-
eration of a purely religious matter".56 By a 4-3 majority, the
45 See Christ the King Reg'l High Sch., 644 F. Supp. at 1492.
"See New York State Empl. Rels. Bd., 90 N.Y.2d at 247; see also N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 700 (McKinney 1988) (protecting employees in the exercise of freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designating representatives for the purpose of collective
bargaining).
47 See New York State Empl. Rels. Bd., 90 N.Y.2d at 248.
" See id; see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 707 (McKinney 1988) (providing for judicial
enforcement of an order pursuant to an unfair labor practice).
49 See New York State Empl. Rels. Bd., 90 N.Y.2d at 247.
'o See id. at 250.
58 N.Y.2d 108 (1983).
52 See id. at 112.
See id.
"See id.
See id at 113.
wId.
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Court of Appeals denied the husband's motion to dismiss.57 The
majority tiptoed through some dicey concerns and precedential
implications.58
The Court of Appeals also recently decided a heart-rending
intra-family adoption case that involved a Get, which was part of
a quid pro quo settlement of a divorce, support and custody
agreement reached in 1986.' 9 Prior to the birth of the child, the
biological father agreed to give the petitioner-biological mother a
Get on condition that the child be adopted and he be relieved of
any future financial responsibility.' Eventually, a bitter chal-
lenge by the biological mother erupted against the adoptive par-
ents, the 10-year-old child's grandparents.61  The biological
mother's goal was to unravel the adoption and gain custody of
her daughter-sister. 62 The Court of Appeals held that the surro-
gate's failure to inform the biological mother that she was enti-
tled to counsel of her choice did not invalidate her consent under
the circumstances presented.63
In Griffin v. Coughlin,' an inmate in the Shawangunk Cor-
rectional Facility in Ulster County sought excusal from the facil-
ity's Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment Program.' Par-
ticipation was required to maintain eligibility in the Family
Reunion Program.6  Griffin declared himself an atheist or ag-
nostic. 7 He asserted that the program was coercive, was based
on religious principles, and incorporated the "twelve steps" and
"twelve traditions" of Alcoholics Anonymous which, he claimed,
were religiously oriented.' Supreme Court and the Appellate
', See id. at 111, 116.See id. at 114-115 (stating that because the case involved "neutral principles
of contract law," and did not require the court to pass on any issue of doctrine or re-
ligious duty, the court enforced the secular provisions of the contract, even though
"entered into as part of a religious ceremony").
69 Chaya S. v. Frederick Herbert L., 90 N.Y.2d 389 (1997).
'0 See id. at 393.
61 See id. at 394.
62 See id. at 394-95 (noting that following the biological mother's remarriage, the
adoptive parents cut her off from all access to the child, prompting her to seek to
void the adoption).
63 See id. at 397-98; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)(b), as amended
(McKinney 1988) (requiring the court to inform biological parents of their right to be
represented by legal counsel of their choice during adoption proceedings).
88 N.Y.2d 674 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997).
5 See id. at 678.
See id. at 677.
67 See id. at 678.
Id. & n.1 (quoting the Twelve Steps). See also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
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Division69 had concluded that the evidence did not establish a
church-state violation of the Establishment Clause.7" The Court
of Appeals reversed by a vote of 5-2.71 I dissented and agreed
with the lower courts that the use of the Alcoholics Anonymous
methodology in this prison program did not violate Establish-
ment Clause principles, as it was not religious or coercive in this
context.
72
United States v. Lynch" presents a fascinating scenario in
Federal Court. George Lynch and Christopher Moscinski, a
bishop and a monk, had been enjoined by order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York from
violating, or aiding and abetting the violation of, the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994"4 in any way." Notwith-
standing the injunction and the statute, the defendants sat in
the driveway of the Women's Medical Pavilion (the Clinic) in
Dobbs Ferry and blocked vehicles from entering the Clinic's
parking lot.76 They acknowledged police warnings that they were
violating the law, but they remained seated in the driveway.77
Ultimately, they were arrested by the police, who carried them
off the scene." The government charged the defendants with
criminal contempt of the permanent injunction.9 After trial,
Judge John Sprizzo found that the defendants "acted out of a
sense of conscience and sincere religious conviction."0 The court,
first, found that neither defendant acted with the willfulness
WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 59-60 (3 rd ed. 1976) (listing the
"Twelve Steps" and "Twelve Traditions" utilized by members of Alcoholics Anony-
mous to achieve sobriety).69 Griffin v. Coughlin, 211 A.D.2d 187 (N.Y. 1995).
'o See 88 N.Y.2d at 679-80.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 112 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
7' 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
74 18 U.S.C. § 248. The statute prohibits physically obstructing or threatening to
use force against a person for the purpose of preventing that person from entering a
reproductive health services clinic. The statute has been upheld against constitu-
tional challenges in several circuits. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding the statute did not exceed Congress' Commerce Clause power, id.
at 1417-18, and prohibited conduct, not speech, and was therefore not violative of
the First Amendment, id. at 1418), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2431 (1997).





'0 Id. at 169.
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that criminal contempt requires.8' Second, however, the court
added that it would have found the defendants not guilty of
criminal contempt, even assuming the government's proof estab-
lished the requisite willfulness.2 Judge Sprizzo explained that
the facts called for "that exercise of the prerogative of leniency
which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if
the circumstances would otherwise be sufficient to convict.
"83
The government is seeking to appeal the acquittal in this non-
jury bench trial, an intriguing procedural twist of its own.
These few illustrations show how overlapping the common
law and canon jurisprudential universes often are. We cannot
pretend to truly separate identities and isolations in the dis-
charge of our respective, complex responsibilities. The secular
and the religious, the common law and canon law (or its func-
tional equivalents in other religions) are part of a shared cosmos,
connected by moral or ethical gravity. We have our separate or-
bits, to be sure, but occasionally the satellites bump into one an-
other, or come very close to one another's spheres of pull, tug and
centrifugal force. In our pluralistic society, we have mutually
dependent, or at least mutually related, experiences that must
be respected, even when they sharply differ. Tolerance levels
have to be very high. With this awareness and realistic appre-
ciation, I view the First Amendment as insurance for a healthy,
respectful co-existence. The so-called metaphor of the Wall of
Separation of Church and State is often seriously misunderstood.
A wall can join, even while it partitions.
Ultimately, history is a great and important teacher for all
of us in this respect. Secular lawyers and judges need only look
to Dred Scott v. Sandford," Plessy v. Ferguson' and Korematsu
v. United States" for remarkable lessons in intellectual and ju-
'" See id. at 170. The court stated that willfulness "when used in the criminal
context, generally means deliberate conduct done with a bad purpose either to diso-
bey or disregard the law." Id. (citing BLACKs LAW DICTIONARY (5h ed. 1979)). The
defendants' sincere belief, the court held, did not meet this definition. See id.
82 See id. at 171.
Id. (citing United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 1966)).
' 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that slaves were property and descendants of Af-
rican-born slaves were not citizens of the United States).
" 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana statute which mandated segre-
gated train carriages for whites and blacks against Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges).
' 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding constitutional an order evacuating those of
Japanese ancestry from part of the West coast during World War II and excluding
them from their homes, with their subsequent relocation in detention camps).
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risprudential humility. You and I may also jointly wince at the
lessons of the Crusades, Inquisition, and Galileo's experience
(his coerced recantation and the quintessentially Italian sotto
voce sidebar, "Epur si muove")
7
The recent public exposition of the church annulment proc-
ess is the latest perplexing occasion, certainly in the American
experience, for forthright, attentive and constructive evaluation
and education. The perception of favoritism by rank, privilege
and monetary advantage has reemerged and again been
splashed across our awareness and consciences. Some may ar-
gue the issue is misportrayed and exploitive. But the charges
blare forth that the process is unfair, unequal, intellectually
ambiguous, hypocritical or unfaithful to principle.' These are
deeply disturbing accusations and generate an atmosphere of
skewed reality and ecclesiastical frustration that must somehow
be dealt with, not defensively but with honest discussion, educa-
tion, fundamental re-examination perhaps, and eventually ap-
propriate reform in fact and in perception and attitudes. I was
struck by references in an essay in Time Magazine entitled
Should Annulments Be So Easy?, containing quotes, relevant to
this reference and overall theme, from the Holy Father and
Bishop Thomas Doran:
[Iun 1994 Pope John Paul II warned the Roman Rota ... against
a 'mistaken idea of compassion and mercy' that might cloud true
justice. Thomas Doran, who served on the Rota until he was
made Bishop of Rockford, Ill., understands both sides. Ameri-
can Catholics live 'with a divorce mentality,' he says, and are
bound to be affected by it. But they are also subject to Catholic
canon law, which has always strictly carried out Jesus's teach-
ing against divorce. Doran and his colleagues are in the middle.
They would like to stem the annulment tide. "But the trouble,"
he sighs, "is that saying no is never an easy thing to do."89
87 See ROBERT S. McELVAINE, MARIO CUOMO: A BIOGRAPHY 393 (1988)
("Recounting Galileo's whisper after being forced by the Church to deny that earth
orbits the sun, 'E pur si muove' (But still it moves), Cuomo said that despite the out-
come of the 1984 election, he would continue to say of the Democratic principles, 'E
pur si muove.").
88 See Pamela Schaeffer, Shattered Faith: A Woman's Struggle to Stop the
Catholic Church from Annulling her Marriage, NAT'L CATH. RPTR., May 30, 1997, at
14 (reviewing Sheila Rauch Kennedy's Shattered Faith); Sharon Seitz, Annulment
Divides Divorced Catholics, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 1997, at 8D.
David Van Biema, Should Annulments Be So Easy?, TIME, May 12, 1997, at
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Adhering to principle while applying equity proves to be a
very tricky combination in our striving for justice.
When the Holy Father, as I noted earlier, inspiringly, and
now seemingly in regular refrain, acknowledges certain manifest
errors in some of the Church's history, and openly and humbly
begs forgiveness for past wrongs, as he did again in April, 1997,
in Prague," he sets an extraordinary personal and institutional
example for our respective disciplines, too. Pope John Paul II's
1996 measured message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences
referred to and reiterated his 1992 message, which I quote in
part:
This unitary character of culture, which in itself is positive and
desirable even in our own day, was one of the reasons for Gali-
leo's condemnation. The majority of theologians did not recog-
nize the formal distinction between sacred Scripture and its in-
terpretation, and this led them unduly to transpose into the
realm of the doctrine of the faith a question that in fact pertained
to scientific investigation.91
He closed this nuanced yet frank acknowledgment with a
quote, ironically, from Einstein about the "comprehensib[ility]" of
the cosmos.9" This, to me, is very instructive. It is a humble
awareness of epistemological ambiguity and uncertainty, yet of
evolving knowledge. Though we are, to be sure, people of faith,
we believe and work in the realm of reason, not chaos. We also
believe in the persistent pursuit of truth and the ever-unfolding
potentiality and purification that comes from the correction and
admission of mistakes or from newly discovered knowledge or
refined truth. Faith need not be lessened or weakened by such
frank acknowledgments.
Another part of the American jurisprudential tradition in
this regard is worthy of mention. It is found ingrained in Su-
preme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' view that "[s]unlight is ...
the best of disinfectants."'3 There is an American brashness and
90 See Pope Urges Christians to Forgive Past Wrongs, THE RECORD, Apr. 28,
1997, at Al (noting Pope during Prague visit reiterated his 1995 apology "for 'the
wrongs inflicted on non-Catholics').
91 Origins, CNS Documentary Service, v. 26, no. 22, Nov. 14, 1996, at 351
(emphasis added) (quoting Pope John Paul II, Origins, CNS Documentary Service,
v. 22, Nov. 12, 1992, at 369ff (Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on
Galileo on Oct. 31, 1992)).
See id. at 352. "What is eternally incomprehensible in the world is that it is
comprehensible." Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (validating as constitutional the dis-
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a quintessential oversimplicity to his quotable quote, but it typi-
fies our preference for openness and, correspondingly, for the
exhilaration of churning change. Opponents to this view may
seem to draw themselves up into a King Canute-like pose, that
would defy the laws of nature and the tides, and dare to insist on
acceptance of and adherence to views by ukases. We recognize
from the Canute imagery alone how foolish that is. Instead, the
power of reason, time, reflection and, ultimately, faith, infused
by the grace of spirit and inspiration, brings people and history
to epiphanies of clearer understanding and more meaningful
adjustment among themselves.
The more we human beings seem to know, even with the
gush and onrush of instantaneous technological overload and the
litter of e-mail messages, the more aware we should become of
the distractions from absorbing or sorting or fully computing
what is relevant and relatively more important. Cocky indi-
viduals find course corrections counter-intuitive. Some entities
exude an overly confident pose of self-assurance based on a
wrongheaded sense that examination and need for regular
change and refreshment are counter-tradition.
On the other hand, Blessed Mother Church has survived
rather well for almost 2,000 years not only because of some bed-
rock principles and operating policies that I have barely touched
upon, but also because of an institutional belief in continuity
through reasonable, not absolute, stasis or stability. The point is
sometimes missed or insufficiently appreciated how She under-
goes and undertakes major, massive changes, too, as part of her
dynamic, albeit divinely, protected growth and survival. Some of
these historical shifts are reactive and some are self-initiated-
gracefully inspired by the Holy Spirit, many of us still firmly be-
lieve.
Magnificently, the brilliant comet of Vatican II, launched by
Pope John XXIII, proves in the most demonstrative way how
dramatic change and openness to fresh air, to use the late, re-
vered Holy Father's imagery along with that of Justice Brandeis,
can reform and self-revolutionize Church thinking and transform
the people of God. I am as proud of that ability and actualization
for hospitality to new ideas in our Church, frankly, as I am of the
closure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, requiring disclo-
sure of source and amounts of campaign contributions) (citing LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)).
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secular Judicial Branch's role in our sometimes messy, raucous
social experiment of participating in a democracy. The very re-
cent canon law recodification is yet another manifestation of a
similar willingness to risk exploration, re-examination and
change, when time and careful study prove right and move the
spirit to action.
To return, then, to my essential theme, I restate that what-
ever we do in our respective disciplines with the Letter of the
Law, the Spirit of Equity-that special kind of epikeia-serves as
the Great Leveler. As Pio Cardinal Laghi has said in a more
general context, "Nuance, it is everything."" Equity's rich his-
torical development and application in the individualization of
law precepts, as applied to people and cases, is what propels us
and our processes towards realistic justice and as close to the
philosophically idealized version as we dare expect as human
beings. I find it a fascinating irony-or perhaps a wonder-filled
coincidence-that the equity component of Anglo-American
common law grew out of and was borrowed from the ecclesiasti-
cal courts.
A few words of caution and special alert are worth inter-
spersing here. The clash of narcissism and the common good,
particularly exemplified in American jurisprudence, with its em-
phasis on individual rights, presents a paradox and perplexity
for the harmony I seek to encourage and discern between canon
and common law. While I am surprised at how often variations
ultimately blend into commonalities among the various codices,
common law and constitutions (written and unwritten), I am
acutely aware also of fundamental differences in essence, ontol-
ogy, substance, style, procedure and goals between the two dis-
ciplines.
Yet, when I revisit the documents of Vatican II merely as an
interested lay student, I am buoyed by the general principles of
religious freedom, tolerance and ecumenical spirit that uplift and
illuminate our goals and purposes, both as individuals and as
community. These concepts parallel secular law exaltations of
freedom and due process (synonyms for fairness, notice, oppor-
tunity to be heard and equity and justice from neutral tribunals).
I work with these concepts in my official capacity and judicial
role, yet I perceive one major divergence in the Church and State
" Paul Wilkes, The Popemakers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at
289
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approaches to these lofty precepts and their application. In
canon law, these same sorts of values, virtues and principles are
deemed and declared to be not ends in themselves; rather, they
are in service of and subordinate to the responsibility to fulfill
duties in community life, albeit as a means to every individual's
higher purposes, and rooted in the human dignity of the person,
the individual--our "soulness," if I may use that distinctive
characteristic. A comparison might be drawn in the merging of
seven personalities and sets of values, the Judges, serving their
higher, common institutional purpose of the tribunal called the
New York Court of Appeals. The American experience as to
these core values, on the other hand, seems overridingly driven
by a kind of secular theology and adoration, sometimes even
idolatry, of the individual. At times, this emerges as a separa-
tion from the common good overarch. Individuality and its vir-
tually sacred enclave in our civil law universe seem freestanding
and are all too often treated as ends in themselves.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that our worlds are
sometimes ill-fitting and ill-suited to one another, especially in
the latter half of this 20th Century. Yale Professor Stephen Car-
ter, in his provocative book The Culture of Disbelief How Ameri-
can Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion,95 decries this
unfortunate dichotomy and phenomenon. I also worry about it,
sometimes and somewhat.
Make no mistake about a feature you often see over-
emphasized: secular judges also occasionally disagree among
themselves in result and expression over important societal con-
cerns and disputes within our own universe. Confronted with
competing claims that often implicate society's most treasured
freedoms, judges externalize the experience, intellect, reason and
passion that they use to reach and articulate their votes in the
reasoned decisions of their courts that are then cloaked with the
seeming imperturbability of stare decisis. For the now, judges
decide the particular dispute; and, for the future, they promul-
gate a ratio decidendi, a principle that binds and guides, until
experience, fresh insight or new learning point to change. As
preoccupied as judges sometimes are or seem with the individual
as such, I believe that their minds' eyes rarely lose sight of the
repercussions on the larger whole of the community.
9" See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRiVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
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The marvelous marriage of the letter of the law and the
spirit of equity in the individualized application is undergoing
some strain with "statutification," the present enormous legisla-
tive activity, codification and regulation by Congress, state legis-
latures and countless agencies at all levels of governance. This
multiplication is a phenomenon, or a plague some might say,
that may translate into a kind of Teilhardian diminishment of
the true judicial process, an ironical reduction of the full promise
of justice. The reason is that the theory and practice of excessive
legislative activity and limitations on judicial discretion and
authority, which constitutes a bureaucratization of the admini-
stration of law, reduces the likelihood or opportunities for the
moderating infusion of equity and dispensation of epikeia.
The paradoxical process of deciding cases remains dynamic
and stable, personal yet collegial and individualized in applica-
tion and generalized in consequence. The reason is that people
and government require harmony even while they operate in
varying degrees and kinds of continuing disagreement and dizzy-
ing flux over so many facets of life. Equity is also relatively dy-
namic, while law, common and canonical, operates through rela-
tively static dictates. This is where the letter meets the spirit.
This is where humanity, rather than hubris, reigns. This is
where Law and Equity, the body and soul of Justice, join forces
to give people that highest of virtues--Justice. This is where
canon law may meet common law with similar challenges and
accomplishments.
So what might we look for together as an overarching meas-
ure of success in the fiduciary discharge of our secular or canoni-
cal responsibilities? Justice Holmes, again, offers us a template
through a letter to then Chief Judge Cardozo, that the recipient
treated as a personal treasure: "[Niot place or power or popular-
ity makes the success that one desires, but the trembling hope
that one has come near to an ideal."" That measure-of-success
standard reverberates across the decades and through the voice
of the hardened, Civil-War-wounded veteran and realist. It
sounds as though Holmes bought into the Aristotelian ideal of
justice as "The Highest Virtue."97 It may be unattainable, but it
is worthy of the rules of the game and the stretch to reach for its
'6 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 77, 86 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
97 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Olympian prize, he teaches us, or at least so he wrote to his
friend and eventual successor on the United States Supreme
Court.
My favorite Old Testament quote is from Daniel, Chapter
12, Verse 3: "[T]hose who lead the many to justice shall be like
the stars forever."98 Emphasis on the many, not on the self, is
key. It seems to me that community goals, not individual nar-
cissism, gain a powerful joint launch from the lesson of the
Prophet Daniel to that of Justice Holmes, with the Philosopher
Aristotle thrown in for good measure. The fusion of their fuels is
magnificently synergistic.
One of Chief Judge Cardozo's astounding teaching exertions
is his essay simply titled Values." In it, Cardozo invokes a
beautiful parable about the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe, a
16th Century contemporary of Galileo within the same Coperni-
can influence. Brahe's work was observing the heavens. A new
King's advisors informed the monarch that Brahe's work was a
waste of time and money. The King's court and courtiers felt
they could not afford Brahe and did not respect or value his
work. He was dismissed- "downsized" in 20th century terms.
Cardozo echoes Brahe's plaintive poem about the lost value to fu-
ture generations of his or any astronomer's service in counting
and charting a bunch of stars:
Yes, I still hope in some more generous land
To make my thousand [stars] up before I die.
Little enough, I know-a midget's work.
[Those] that follow me with more delicate art
May add their tens of thousands; yet my sum
Will save them just that five and twenty years
Of patience, bring them sooner to their goal,
That Kingdom of the law I shall not see.100
This set the stage and context for Cardozo's interpretation of
Tycho Brahe's baleful experience.1' Cardozo, a nonpracticing
'8 Daniel 12:3 (emphasis added); see also Joseph W. Bellacosa, Symbols, Slo-
gans, and Cymbals of Criminal Justice: Where's the Substance?, 36 CATH. LAW. 375,
377 (1996).99 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Values: The Choice of Tycho Brahe, in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 1 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
0 See id. at 4 (quoting a poem by Alfred Noyes, entitled "Watchers of the
Skies").
'I cannot help being reminded again of Galileo's almost contemporaneous ca-
nonical interdiction. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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Sephardic Jew and a nonreligious person by his own declaration,
was nevertheless a profoundly spiritual, even ascetic, individual,
as his powerful yet sweet portrait overlooking our courtroom in
the Court of Appeals Chamber depicts. He applies the poignant
lesson of Brahe's being cashiered, in this beautiful summary:
The submergence of self in the pursuit of an ideal, the readiness
to spend oneself without measure, prodigally, almost ecstati-
cally, for something intuitively apprehended as great. and noble,
spend oneself one knows not why-some of us like to believe
that this is what religion means. ... Let us not make the blunder
of supposing that to live in communion with these ineffable val-
ues of the spirit, to spend oneself utterly in sacrifice and devo-
tion, is a lot reserved for a chosen few, for an aristocracy of
genius, for those that will be ranked in history among the
mighty or the great.... To the glory of our humanity, the lowly
equally with the mighty may be partakers in this bliss. ... They
had made it in humbler forms, by love, by gentleness, by sweet-
ness, by devotion, by sacrifice of self .... We may not always
have been conscious of its beauty. The end comes, and behold it
is illuminated with the white and piercing light of the divinity
within it. We have walked with angels unawares.
102
This was not some early 20th century preachment of ancient
Aristotelian idealism. It was Judge Cardozo's description of a
practical, real life role and lessons set in a 16th century parable,
and a perspective for his and our times throughout this 20th cen-
tury, looking towards the imminent 21st. It dedicates daily, or-
dinary work to Law, Equity and, ultimately, Justice. Judge Car-
dozo, on another occasion, sweetly and self-deflatingly seasoned
the serious, mystical point with a lighthearted reference to
Charles Francis Adams' measuring rod, that no matter who you
are and what you do, if at the end of a day or year you had not
made a "conspicuous ass" of yourself, you are doing "okay." How
disarmingly refreshing that is. I could live with that kind of an
"okay," at the end of any day's work.
102 Cardozo, supra note 99, at 4-5.
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